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New streams of thought on consciousness
Perception holds a particular place in research to man's self-understanding. O'Regan's Why Red
Doesn't Sound Like a Bell gives the reader an inspiring account of the nature and functioning of
sensory perception and its relation to consciousness. Based on old philosophical problems and
recent findings in the neurosciences, O'Regan sketches out a new viewing on both seeing and feeling
in their relevance for understanding consciousness. O'Regan's critical assessment of different views
on perception and their relation to consciousness is relevant to the expert, but it also provides an
interesting read for the non-expert.
Throughout history, the subject of perception and its relation to consciousness has held great
fascination for science and philosophy. Perception is so close to us that it can hardly be
described as an external phenomenon: it does not only `appear' to us, it also overlaps with
ourselves. Perception thereby shows a double relation. One would be intuitively tempted to think
that perception holds a somewhat passive relation to the world. Phenomena seem to impress on
our senses in a causal fashion, and these in their turn somehow c`ause' certain images in the
mind that determine our consciousness and possible conclusions of the reality perceived. This rather
linear picture was already analysed and criticised by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason.
In spite of such longstanding criticisms of the `naive' picture of perception, it still holds sway
over Western thought till these days, specifically in the context of the emergence of psychology
and the neurosciences. But of recent, findings and new approaches in the neurosciences have
internally challenged this notion.
The notion one holds of consciousness is decisive of how one frames the nature of perception.
There are at least three standard approaches that attempt to comprehend the fundamental nature,
role, and functioning of consciousness:
1. The idealist conception of consciousness as essence. This view on consciousness is related to
ancient Greek sources, Platonist philosophy in specific. It takes consciousness to be the core of
one's identity, as the seat of the Self in relation to perception of the world.
2. The materialist conception of an equation of the mind and the brain. Here, consciousness is
explained in terms of material functions and properties. It conceives consciousness as biologically
determined. This view goes back at least to the 18th century philosopher La Mettrie, but a
contemporary proponent is Daniel Dennett.
3. The phenomenological position of consciousness as intentional and relational. Philosophers
such as Kant and Kierkegaard have laid the basis for this position which was later elaborated by
Husserl. It takes consciousness not as a passive `blank slate' onto which impressions are printed
but instead as oriented towards what is perceived and, in some senses, even constructing what
is perceived.
The neurosciences often take a materialist view on consciousness. The development of technol-
ogy has been very influential for our use of metaphors for the mind and the brain. Clockwork
mechanics, hydraulics, telegraph lines, and computer chips determined our understanding of the
mind and the brain, but in this influence, they also restricted this understanding to deterministic and
mechanistic frameworks of interpretation. Whilst productive in gaining insight in some aspects
of the functioning of the brain, such a view has stood in the way of acknowledging some aspects of
its wider context in terms of the relation to perception and the world perceived.
O'Regan opposes views from the second category on the basis of their failure to explain `qualia',
or the `what-it-is-like'-ness of raw feel. He opposes the idea that feel is merely something that
is generated by the brain through an external impulse. He sketches out an account of perception
as intentional in nature, therefore positioning his views in terms of the third type of approach.
The presupposition of the linear picture of the relation reality ^ perception ^ consciousness is
now largely regarded to be flawed: the active nature of the brain as well as the sensory organs in
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how we perceive the world is largely acknowledged in neurology. But this does not dismiss the
fact that, even with this `Copernican turn' for the Western worldview, it is still held to be
objectively known and analysed how such systems function. O'Regan not only draws from a wide
array of examples to illustrate the radical nature of this Copernican turn; he also embraces
the necessary modesty this entails for the neurosciences themselves. In his choice of examples,
he illustrates neuroscientific findings by practical daily life experience, thereby rendering the
complicated area of perception as it is studied in the neurosciences accessible for a broader
audience. He does not draw conclusions from these findings that would place perception in the
world of `the things out there', and always stays conscious of the subjectivity of sensory perception.
O'Regan states that several paradoxes that were until recently monopolised by philosophy, have
entered the field of neurology, both as object of study and as problem for the epistemological
status of that study. These paradoxes are connected to definition questions (entailing questions
such as `what is consciousness', `on the basis of which criteria can we define consciousness', or
`to what phenomena do we restrict consciousness') as well as the distortion that certain `findings',
or at least conclusions on what consciousness is, may have for the presuppositions that make
the science possible as such. These questions are very much embedded in our views of the self.
As a neuroscientist, O'Regan is very much aware of the problem of the double nature of perception.
He acknowledges the mystery of this double ontology of consciousness: as both something that can
be studied (be it through neurology or philosophy) and the subject that is studying, perceiving,
seeing, etc, respectively. O'Regan acknowledges the deficient attitude that is widely existent in
neurology, of a mapping, or c`artography', of consciousness.
In the history of Western thought, one can discern two opposing worldviews: one that affirms
determinism and one that affirms free will. The question of determinism and free will was
already prominent in the debate between Luther and Erasmus, came to be treated by Enlight-
enment philosophers such a La Mettrie in the interpretation of the mind as a clockwork, and
has since taken a central position in both philosophical and scientific debate. Neuroscientific
research touches upon issues of the relation between mind and body, and the status of these
concepts, the nature of human identity, the age-old debate between determinism and free will.
In recent years, neuroscientists often popularise their work by taking strong positions towards
the problem of determinism. Whilst in philosophy this issue has, by now, been demonstrated as
much more complicated than a mere duality between `free will' and `determinism', neuroscientists
often fall into the trap of interpreting their work and its results as a confirmation of a determin-
istic worldview. So, although current advances in the neurosciences raise substantial philosophical
questions about consciousness, they are often presented to resolve them by reducing them to a
deterministic and mechanistic account of consciousness. A problem for the deterministic world-
view that is so prominent in how the neursciences are often presented in the media is that one
cannot see one's identity as merely something one has, but always also as something one is.
The neurosciences find themselves in the impossible cross-over area of studying something in
between having and being one's traits. Whilst philosophy is much richer in its views on human
nature and personal identity, debates on neuroscience research remain rather formal, methodo-
logical, and thus inadequate. O'Regan provides for a much needed richer perspective on the
neurosciences. O'Regan bases his views on the scientific state of the art in neurologyöthe true
nature and significance of its results and on the insights provided by the history of philosophy.
O'Regan does not make the mistake to view his work as an answer to age-old philosophical
questions. He rather takes his work as complementary to such questions and their treatment.
Although very much interested in earlier philosophical views on the problem of perception,
he does not take a stark deterministic view on either perception or man as such.
The more dominant views on human consciousness such as the idealist view, the mechanistic
view and the intentionalist view have a specific historic and philosophical background. The
neurosciences take implicit and explicit positions towards such views, either confirming them or
taking them as hidden epistemological ground. They are, however, in many ways not commensur-
able: a deterministic position excludes the possibility of intentionalism, and an idealist account
of consciousness cannot be brought into accordance with a materialist account. Such worldviews
also play an important role in how new insights in the neurosciences are received. The view one
holds on human nature and its influence on one's (conception of) personal identity are crucial
in one's view on how one evaluates the development and application of neuroscientific technologies.
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O'Regan's intentionalist view on perception and consciousness serves to liberate the broader
interpretation of the neurosciences from its mechanistic tendencies. For readers of Perception,
O'Regan's Why Red Doesn't Sound Like a Bell provides for a well-argued criticism of and a
strong alternative to deterministic perspectives on perception and its role in consciousness.
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